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INTRODUCTION 
The task of jurisprudence for legal realists is a practical aim to ensure that 
judicial decisionmaking promotes social welfare and increases the predictability 
of legal outcomes. I This focus on the functional effects of judicial 
decisionmaking requires sufficient knowledge of the social sciences to enable 
judges to understand social policy implications when fashioning legal remedies.2 
Legal realism has dominated judicial decisionmaking in most areas of the law.3 
Family law4 jurisprudence, however, reflects the law's inconsistency with 
families' real life experiences and with relevant social science research in child 
development and family relations.s Historically,judges have attempted to fashion 
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1. THEoDOREM. BENDI1T, Legal Realism, in LAW AS A RULE AND PRINCIPLE 1-21 (1978), 
reprinted in DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON TIIE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM 69 (1994). 
2.1d. at 70. 
3. Gary B. Melton & Brian L. Wilcox, Changes in Family Law and Family Lifo: 
Challenges for Psychology, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1213, 1214 (1989). 
4. Family law in this Article means a comprehensive approach to family law subject matter 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over cases involving divorce, separation, and annulment; 
property distribution; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, 
adoption, and termination of parental rights; juvenile delinquency; child abuse and child 
neglect; domestic violence; criminal non-support; name change; guardianship of minors and 
disabled persons; withholding or withdrawal oflife-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary 
admissions, and emergency evaluations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 921-928 (1975 
& Supp. 1994); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-14 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., [FAM. LAW] 
§ 1-201 (1991 & Supp. 1996); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3.223 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.J. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:434-8 (West 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1996). 
5. Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 1214. Another scholar has critiqued the incoherence 
between the social reality of families and family law: 
The current incoherence between family reality and the images offamily in law 
expose the dominant ideology [of the traditional family model] and its role in 
policy formation. Refusing to address and to assess the continued viability of 
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morality in the determination of family legal issues rather than to devise legal 
remedies that accommodate how families live.6 This approach to decisionmaking 
must change if family law jurisprudence is to effectuate the well-being of 
families and children. A new approach to family law jurisprudence can assist 
decisionmakers to account for the realities of families' lives when determining 
family legal issues. 
The lack of legal realism in family law is troublesome given the extent of court 
involvement in the lives of families and children. A recent Wall Street Journal 
article has revealed that family law cases constitute about thirty-five percent of 
the total number of civil cases handled by the majority of our nation's courts, a 
percentage which constitutes "the largest and fastest growing part of the state 
civil caseload.,,7 The focus of judicial decisionmaking in family law needs to 
become how the state intervenes in family life, rather than whether the state 
ought to intervene, g as court involvement itself constitutes state intervention. 
Changes over the last few decades in the structure and function of the 
American family, as well as the relative complexity of contemporary family legal 
issues, challenge judges to adopt an appropriate jurisprudential philosophy that 
addresses these transformations. The tremendous volume and breadth of family 
law cases now before the courts, coupled with the critical role of the family in 
today's society to provide stable and nurturing environments for family members, 
require that judges understand relevant social science research about child 
development and family life. This informed perspective can assist 
decisionmakers to dispense justice aimed at strengthening and supporting 
families. 9 
This Article proposes an interdisciplinary approach to resolve family legal 
proceedings. The interdisciplinary perspective helps judges consider the many 
influences on human behavior and family life, thereby resulting in more 
pragmatic and helpful solutions to contemporary family legal issues. Part I of the 
Article begins with an overview of demographic information about the 
ideological assumptions, politicians and pundits resort to condemnation and to 
repressive policy suggestions. This pattern of reaction to changing family 
behavior should raise questions about the responsive capabilities of our law-
making institutions. 
Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. 
L. REv. 2181, 2186 (1995). 
6. Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 1214; cf Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1790 (1995) (arguing that state legislatures and courts fashion laws 
and decisions in the domestic relations area by reflecting shared or community values about 
family life). 
7. ST. JUSTICEINST., ST. CT. CASELOAD STAT. ANN. REp. 1992 (Feb. 1994), cited in Amy 
Stevens, The Busines of Law: Lawyers and Clients; More Than Just Torts, WALL ST. J., July 
1, 1994, at B6; see also Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-
First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1993,2006-07 (1993) (predicting that family law cases will 
increase and are likely to become more difficult). 
8. SUSAN MOLLER aKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 130 (1989). 
9. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 835, 854-55 (1985) (arguing that courts base their decisions in family law cases on policy 
considerations, which decisions thereafter affect the nature offamily roles and relationships). 
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composition and function of the American family in today's society. It then 
reviews the scope of family law adjudication facing today's courts and justifies 
the need for decisionmakers to view family legal problems with an expansive 
focus. Part II argues for application of a behavioral sciences paradigm, or the 
ecology of human development,JO to provide the social science basis for more 
effective and therapeutic jurisprudence l1 in family law. Demonstrating the 
relevance of this theoretical framework to fashion family legal outcomes, a novel 
application of social science within the law, makes clear the need to rely on 
social science theories and findings in family law adjudication. Part III of the 
Article explains how an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm 
operates when applied to determine family legal matters, as well as how this 
interdisciplinary approach differs from traditional notions of adjudication. 
I. F AMIL Y LAW JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEXT: THE STATE 
OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 
A. The Changing Nature of the Family 
The family justice system increasingly finds itself attempting to respond to 
changes in family life.12 Dramatic changes in the structure of the family have 
occurred in the past few decades. These changes have resulted in part from 
greater geographic mobility, increased life expectancy, new reproductive 
technologies, transformations in women's roles, and declining adherence to 
formal religion. 13 
10. URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979). 
11. David Wexler defines therapeutic jurisprudence as follows: 
Therapeuticjurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic 
agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may produce 
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Such consequences may flow from 
substantive rules, legal procedures, or from the behavior of legal actors (lawyers 
or judges). 
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 8 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 
1991) (footnote omitted). 
12. Melton, supra note 7, at 1993-94. It is challenging to define the notion offamily: 
It is impossible to offer many generalizations or universal statements about the 
family that some authority will not challenge. While one expert argues that the 
family as a social institution is not only dissolving but has actually become an 
anachronism, another applauds its state of health and a third maintains that though 
there might be some changes in family structure, eventually it will evolve to a 
more viable form. Each position is accompanied by an impressive array of data. 
Each conclusion is credible if the reader is willing to accept each authority's 
implicit definition of what a family is and what it should be. 
ROBERTM. MORONEY, THE FAMILY AND THE STATE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 15 
(1976) (footnotes omitted). 
13. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND 
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 4 (1989). 
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An examination of birth rate statistics documents that over the last few decades 
children comprise a smaller proportion oftoday's society, and there are fewer 
children per family.14 From 1950 until 1992, the birth rate for all Americans 
declined by one-third, 15 although births to unmarried women increased from five 
percent in 196016 to twenty-four percent in 1992.17 
Mothers' employment outside the home also has changed dramatically. Married 
mothers who work outside the home and who have children between the ages of 
six and seventeen years have increased from a rate of thirty-nine percent in 1960 
to seventy-five percent in 1993.18 The percentage of unmarried mothers 
participating in the labor force has increased from sixty-six percent in 1960 to 
seventy-eight percent in 1993.19 Among married mothers with children under the 
age of six years, labor force participation has increased from about nineteen 
percent in 1960 to almost sixty percent in 1993.20 The labor force participation 
rates for unmarried mothers with children under six years have increased from 
forty-one percent in 1960 to sixty percent in 1993.21 
The number of individuals divorcing has quadrupled from 1950 to 1992.22 The 
high divorce rate translates to the termination of over one million American 
marriages annually, and these divorces disrupt the lives of over three million 
men, women, and children.23 This unparalleled divorce rate has resulted in "a 
high remarriage rate and the creation of blended [or reconstituted] famiIies.,,24 In 
14. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, 
at 64,75 (114th ed. 1994); see also MARY Jo BANE, HERETO STAY: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19 (1976). 
15. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 75. 
16. Melton, supra note 7, at 1994. 
17. AMARA BACHU, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN, JUNE 
1992, at xix (1993). 
18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 402. 
19.Id. 
20. /d.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 8 (1992). 
21. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 402. 
22. !d. at 75. 
23. Id. at 103; see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE 
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 
at xvii (1985). 
24. Melton, supra note 7, at 1996; see Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of 
Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 
CORNELL L. REv. 45, 87 (1981). Younger criticizes current divorce law because of the courts' 
failure to consider children's welfare in deciding whether to grant or deny the divorce. !d. at 
84. She suggests that "[t]he law should require at least an individual detennination of how a 
divorce will affect minor children; their welfare should bear directly on their parents' rights to 
end their marriage." Id. at 90; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About 
Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 91 (1990) (arguing for family law to reflect parties' 
precommitment to relationships in the areas of marriage and divorce in order to reduce 
psychological and economic harm, especially to children). 
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addition, the number of unmarried Americans cohabitating has increased from 
about eleven million in 1960 to thirty-seven million in 1993.25 
Along with changes in the structure of the American family, many of the 
functions the family performs for its members also have changed.26 Historically, 
the family has served as the locus of emotional, spiritual, financial, and 
educational support for its members.27 The state now performs many of the 
functions once performed only by the family?8 For example, the state has become 
more involved in matters of education and in caring for the dependent members 
of our society through public assistance and social security. 29 This shifting of 
family functions to the state has contributed to a new image of the family that 
contemporary family law decisionmaking must reflect. Despite the fact that the 
state has assumed some functions traditionally performed by the family, however, 
the state has not met all of families' needs for social support. 30 Some needs, such 
as child care for working parents, remain unmet.31 
Family roles and relationships also have transformed as the structure of the 
family has altered. These changes in family roles and relationships both arise 
from and contribute to the redefined functions the family now performs. Family 
life has become more complex and demanding. Many families regularly face the 
crises and challenges surrounding unemployment, violent crime, drug and 
alcohol abuse, spousal and child abuse, and the stress created by competing time 
demands.32 The increased mobility of contemporary families often results in a 
25. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 58. Statistics related to family 
composition may not provide a complete picture of the reality offamily life: 
Looking at family reality, however, involves more than just a reference to these 
empirical changes. The statistics have normative as well as empirical implications. 
The fact that the United States has a multiplicity of ethnic, religious, and cultural 
traditions, supports the argument that we should develop a pluralistic social model 
inclusive of diverse family practices. 
Fineman, supra note 5, at 2189. 
26. See David 1. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justificationsfor 
Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 183,212-56 (1995) (providing a 
comprehensive historical analysis of the political role of the family in American society, 
including its responsibility to produce good citizens, to produce socially diverse citizens, to 
facilitate the development of associations with others, and to promote tolerance for diversity); 
cf Fineman, supra note 5, at 2182 (arguing that continuing to hold certain unrealistic beliefs 
about the family negatively affects our ability to resolve social problems of caring' for 
dependent members of society). 
27. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD 1. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF 
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1977). 
28. MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMIL Y: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE at viii (1977). 
29. [d. at viii, 1. 
30. Melton, supra note 7, at 2000. 
31. See Fineman, supra note 5, at 2214 (discussing empirical information regarding how 
families respond to caretaking issues and who performs child care for families). 
32. See Melton, supra note 7, at 1996-97. 
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loss of stability for family members/3 a lack of social support systems, and 
increased isolation.34 Nevertheless, relationships outside the family unit, 
including informal social support systems and kinship networks, remain 
important for effective family functioning.3s Paradoxically, for many people the 
complexity of modem society also results in a retreat to the private institution of 
the family for stability.36 
B. Contemporary Family Law Issues 
Given the changes occurring in the structure and function of the American 
family, the family law systems of Western industrial societies began a radical 
transformation in the 1960s in the areas of marriage, divorce, support, and 
parent-child relationships.37 Problems of child maltreatment, juvenile 
delinquency, family violence, substance abuse, economics, and medical or mental 
health issues often began to playa role in and complicate family law cases.38 
Other areas of the law not generally considered family law, such as public 
benefits and employment law, increa~ingly affected families and children.39 If 
these family problems were not challenging enough for the justice system, new 
family members and relationships began to emerge before the courts, including 
the gestational or surrogate mother (who carries the fetus to term),40 the sperm 
33. !d.; see also Janet M. Bowennaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between 
Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 791,795-96 (1992-93) (documenting 
recent demographic data and social, psychological, and related consequences to geographic 
moves involving families and children, including the fact that over eleven million children in 
America change residences annually). 
34. Melton, supra note 7, at 1999; see also EXIENDING FAMILIES: THE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
OF PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (Moncrieff Cochran et al. eds., 1990). 
35. MoncrieffCochran & Frank Woolever, Beyond the Deficit Model: The Empowerment 
of Parents with Information and Informal Supports, in CHANGING FAMILIES 225, 227 (Irving 
E. Sigel & Luis M. Laosa eds., 1983); see also BANE, supra note 14, at 37, 50. 
36. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 27, at 19 (defining the value many people attribute to 
the family as follows: "Here [within the context of the family] they make their moral 
commitments, invest their emotions, plan for the future, and perhaps even hope for 
immortality."). 
37. GLENDON, supra note 13, at 1. 
38. Melton, supra note 7, at 1997-98,2028 (discussing the effects of AIDS cases on the 
family justice system, including an increased need for foster care and complex dependency 
cases); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through 
ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 256 (1996) ("Another source of new )jtigation is 
increased sensitivity to social injustice, and the attendant creation ofJegally enforceable rights 
intended to assist the previously disenfranchised .... Once it was established that women have 
a right not to be battered, the courts became a natural forum for enforcing those rights."). 
39. GLENDON, supra note 28, at 1. 
40. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (concluding that the husband and 
wife were the natural parents of a child born to a gestational surrogate). 
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donor (who remains legally unrelated to the resulting child),41 and the 
psychological parent (who mayor may not be a biological parent to the child).42 
Most family law scholars attribute the skyrocketing divorce rate in the United 
States to the change in substantive family law spawned by California's no-fault 
divorce statute enacted in 1970, enabling couples to divorce more easily.43 This 
change in substantive family law has contributed to refashioning the legal rights 
and responsibilities relative to marriage and to creating new behavioral norms for 
husbands, wives, and family members.44 The need for court intervention to 
accomplish this redefinition of legal rights and responsibilities has resulted in 
substantial increases in the volume of family law C!lses courts must adjudicate 
and in radical alterations regarding the substance and breadth of the legal and 
social issues involved.4s In addition, the transformation of family law has 
occurred so rapidly that our society and our courts continue to address the 
challenges presented.46 
41. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (finding that a 
spenn donor was equitably estopped from asserting parental rights). But see Thordan C. v. Mary 
K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affinning the declaration of the spenn donor 
ofa child conceived by artificial insemination to be the resulting child's legal father). 
42. See Ronald FF v. Cindy GG, 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that a nonbiologicaI 
or psychological "parent" i)ad no rights to visitation absent the consent of the natural mother). 
43. WEmMAN, supra note 23, at x (noting that by 1980, every state but South Dakota and 
Illinois adopted similar legislation). But cf. Jana B. Singer, Divorce ReJorm and Gender 
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (1989) (arguing that the economic circumstances of women and 
children following divorce were not better off under the fault-based system). Legislatures in 
several states, including Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and 
Virginia, recently proposed initiatives designed to end no-fault divorce due to concern over 
high divorce rates and the effects of divorce on children. See Barbara Vobejda, Critics, Seeking 
Change, Fault 'No-Fault' Divorce Laws Jor High Rates, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1996, at A3; 
infra note 122. 
44. WEmMAN, supra note 23, at xv. Family law has begun to reflect some changes in sex-
role behaviors: 
The law has abandoned its fonner express or implicit stereotyping of sex roles 
within marriage and has moved toward a new model in which there is no fixed 
pattern of role distribution. We have seen a movement ... toward equal sharing 
of parental rights and obligations. At the same time, there has been a trend toward 
diminution of the rights of both mothers and fathers, as children are increasingly 
treated as individuals with rights of their own. 
GLENDON, supra note 13, at 102. 
45. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering 
Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 
FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1995) (discussing legal challenges to define marriage and family in 
contemporary American society). Family law continues to present complex challenges: 
No-fault divorce, which was once thought to be one of our more significant social 
achievements, has paled in significance as we have moved on to such 
achievements as children divorcing parents, parents divorcing children, and 
increasingly prevalent awards of joint and multiple custody, palimony, galimony, 
and surrogate parents, in an ever-richer and ever-bubbling family stew. 
H. TEo RUBIN & VIcrOR E. FLANGO, COURT COORDINATION OF FAMILY CASES 64-65 (1992). 
46. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at xvii. 
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One challenge courts face that requires their increasing regulation47 in family 
dissolution cases is determining the economic consequences for family members. 
While enactment in all states of child support guidelines has removed 
significantly the element of judicial discretion in establishing child support and 
generally has resulted in higher and more consistent child support awards,48 the 
poor rate of collection of child support from noncustodial parents49 represents a 
substantial deprivation to children's lives, as well as an example of a serious 
failing of the current court system. so Another economic decision courts must 
make in family dissolution cases is determining whether to grant spousal support 
and how to distribute property upon 9ivorce. In these areas, also, the court 
system appears to shortchange some of its most vulnerable participants: 
The economic consequences to divorce today are the "equitable" division 
of property worth too little to matter; no or short-term alimony; child support 
that fails to ensure a standard of living for the children and their mother 
equivalent to that of the father; outcomes that are inconsistent and often 
unpredictable, and that, for women and children, do [not] appear to be getting 
better; and economic hardship that often could have been lessened through 
more equitable rules.51 
The increase in more female-headed households reSUlting from a greater number 
of divorces 52 has contributed to the "feminization ofpoverty,,,s3 !l term describing 
most women's significant decline in their standard of living within one year after 
divorce, contrasted with their former husbands' improved standard of living. 54 
In addition to the complexity of family law cases, family law issues have 
become the subject of increased numbers of federal appellate cases 55 and of 
47. See GLENDON, supra note 13, at 2. 
48. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth o/DiscretionaryJustice in Family Law: The Child 
Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209,238 (1991-92) (arguing that fixed rules in family 
law decisionmaking offer greater predictability and benefits to litigants in these cases than does 
adjudication involving judicial discretion); see also Margaret Campbell Haynes, Understanding 
the Guidelines and the Rules, 16 FAM. ADvOC. no. 2, 1993, at 14, 17; cf. Linda Hen!), Elrod, 
The Federalization o/Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 103, 129 (1990) 
(finding that, even with application of the child support guidelines, there are substantially 
inconsistent amounts of child support awarded under similar factual circumstances depending 
upon the normative guidelines amount adopted by a particular state). 
49. See Charles Drake & Jan Warner, Support Collection-What's A Client To Do?, 16 
FAM. Aovoc., 1993, no. 2, at 38 (finding that only half of all parents awarded child support 
collect the full amounts; whereas, the other half receive only partial payment or nothing); see 
also WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 321 (citing a recent survey revealing that non-custodial 
parents fail to comply with child support orders at a rate of sixty to eighty percent); Elrod, 
supra note 48, at 128; Fineman, supra note 5, at 2211 n.74. 
50. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 262. 
51. Marsha Garrison, The &onomic Consequences 0/ Divorce, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION 
CTS. REV. 10,22 (1994). 
52. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 350. 
53./d. 
54. /d. at 400. 
55. For examples of family law decisionmaking by the United States Supreme Court, see 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (finding an action in tort by woman on behalf 
of her children against their father and her former husband for child abuse was properly before 
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substantial federal and model state legislation. 56 While some scholars argue in 
favor of this increased federal involvement in family law decisionmaking,57 
others maintain that state decisionmaking in the family law area more 
appropriately reflects a community's perception offamily life.58 In at least one 
area of family law, the establishment and enforcement of child support, "the 
federal government has effectively usurped traditional state supremacy.,,59 The 
debate concerning the federalization of other family law issues is likely to 
continue. 
the federal court, but upholding the domestic relations exception excluding divorce, alimony, 
and child custody decrees from federal court jurisdiction); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 
U.S. 604 (1990) (affirming jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a divorce case when 
service complied with due process requirements); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
(1989) (upholding the constitutionality of an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy); Mansell 
v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (holding that state courts may not treat military retirement pay 
waived by the retiree to receive veterans' disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding unconstitutional certain regulations relating to 
inmate marriages); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding unconstitutional a racial 
classification as a basis for child custody determination); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983), Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979) (determining the constitutionality of state statutes prescribing conditions precedent to 
unwed fathers' receiving notice of adoption proceedings); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) 
(holding unconstitutional a gender-based alimony statute); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978) (holding unconstitutional state restrictions on marriage based upon failure to satisfy 
child support obligations); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding durational residency 
requirements incident to divorce); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute presuming unwed fathers unfit to raise their children); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state restriction on interracial 
marriage). 
56. For examples of federal legislation in the family law area, see Safe Homes for Women 
Act of 1984, § 110A, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1994); Indian Child Welfare Act, § 21, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
(1994); Child Support Enforcement Act, §7, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-669 (West 1991 & Supp. 
1996); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, § 67,42 U.S.C. § 
5101-5106h (1994)]; Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, § 110,42 U.S.C. §§ 
10401-10418 (1994). For examples of model state legislation in the family law area, see UNIF. 
ADOPTION Acr §§ 1-101 to 8-106, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1994); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIcrION 
Acr §§ 1-28,9 U.L.A. 115 (1968); UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY Acr §§ 1-26, 9A U.L.A. 97 
(1983); UNIF. MARRIAGEANDDIVORCEAcr §§ 101-506, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973). 
57. See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. 
REv. 1073, 1075 (1994) (advocating that federal courts exercise diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody cases). 
58. See Dailey, supra note 6, at 1790-91 (defending state sovereignty over family law based 
on the premise that state legislatures and state courts reflect community values in fashioning 
family laws and in rendering decisions in these cases); cf Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic 
Relations Law; Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1 (1984) (suggesting that family law cases raising issues beyond the domestic relations 
exception may be appropriate for federal courts to entertain). 
59. Elrod, supra note 48, at 103 (tracing the history of the federal government's 
involvement in child support issues as a means to reduce the number of welfare recipients). 
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C. The Need/or an Ecological Approach to Family Legal 
Issues 
Most family law scholars argue that the dominant trend in family law 
adjudication and the underlying policy in family law legislation have resulted in 
a greater recognition of individual rights and pragmatism in place of moral 
relativism.60 As a result of this focus on individualism, some suggest that the law 
in this area should permit and encourage couples to negotiate, bargain, and 
determine their own arrangements through private ordering or agreement.61 Given 
the growing sophistication of family law practitioners and the increase in court-
ordered or court-supported mediation,62 it is likely that more individuals will 
60. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American 
Family Law, 1890-1990,28 IND. L. REv. 273, 289 (1995); see also MARTIIA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 6, 
86 (1991); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition From Griswold to Eisenstadt and 
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 (1994); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the 
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985). According to 
Schneider, American family law has undergone two transformations, the first of which occurred 
in the nineteenth century and "increasingly ordered relations between husband and wife, that 
increasingly dealt with the termination of those relations, and that increasingly spoke to the 
relations between parent and child and between the state and the child." [d. at 1805. The 
second transformation occurred in the last 20 years and has been a "shift away from public 
standards to private ordering," including "a fruitful area of generalization [about] the 
relationship between morals and family law .... " !d. at 1805-06 (citations omitted). The author 
suggests, however, that there has been a shift in control of moral decisionmaking from the law 
to the people previously regulated by the law. [d. at 1819-20. 
61. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51 (1979). The authors point out the advantages of 
private ordering, including financial savings by avoiding the costs of litigation, reduction of 
emotional pain by avoiding an adversary proceeding, avoidance of the uncertainty of litigation, 
reduction of delays in court hearings, and achievement of a resolution that is more acceptable 
to both parties over time than one imposed by a court. [d at 956-57. The authors also "believe 
divorcing parents should be given considerable freedom to decide custody matters-subject 
only to the same minimum standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the 
state imposes on all families." [d. at 957 (emphasis in original). In fact, the authors propose that 
"the primary function of the legal system should be to facilitate private ordering and dispute 
resolution .... " 1d at 986; see also 1. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now 
Enforceable, Unless . .. , 21 Hous. L. REv. 757 (1984) (proposing a regulatory scheme to 
determine the enforceability of marital and premarital contracts in an effort to streamline the 
divorce process and to decrease court involvement). 
62. While an analysis of mediation of domestic disputes is beyond the scope of this Article, 
documentation of the growing practice of court-related mediation abounds. See, e.g., Jay 
Folberg et aI., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 343 
(1992) (providing an extensive analysis of comprehensive survey data regarding attitudes 
toward and practices that comprise alternative dispute resolution in California's civil courts, 
as well as identification of problems and proposals); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on 
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or 
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. REsOL. 297 (1996) (arguing that courts must 
incorporate more alternative dispute resolution, yet they must continue to adjudicate cases in 
the traditional manner); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 
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resolve their disputes outside the courtroom. Nonetheless, the number and 
complexity of adjudicated family law cases are likely to increase.63 Even those 
who advocate negotiated settlements acknowledge that some family law cases 
may result in protracted litigation for a variety of reasons, including feelings of 
spite on behalf of one or both parties, as well as a distaste for negotiation.64 
Similarly, others doubt that abdicating family law decisionmaking to any other 
professional group outside the adversary system can improve results.65 The 
public nature of the adversary system involves explanation, debate, and 
contemplated decisions, in contrast to a process such as mediation, where 
decisions generally evolve without any formal consideration by the justice 
system.66 
The concept of privatization suggests a trend in all substantive family law 
areas, as well as in procedural issues, toward private rather than state-imposed 
decisionmaking.67 In the quest for family law jurisprudence that more 
appropriately promotes families' well-being, the privatization offamily law over 
the last few decades may offer "a sort of transition strategy-a way of moving 
from an outdated and unjust public law regime to a system whose publicly-
imposed constraints more accurately reflect social reality and more fairly 
distribute the benefits and burdens of family life.,,68 
Family law adjudication involves functions in addition to the social and private 
dispute resolution functions. Historically, family law has helped shape our 
conceptions of proper roles and values for interpersonal relationships. 69 Along 
with the need for family law decisionmaking to promote families' well-being, the 
1996, at 55 (assessing the incorporation of alternative dispute resolution techniques in 
America's courts and discussing survey results revealing an even split on the desirability of 
mandatory alternative dispute resolution programs, as well as a preference for mediation over 
litigation and arbitration); see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 246-47. But see Penelope E. 
Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics o/Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441 
(1992) (arguing that spousal power disparities evident in divorce mediation reverse efforts of 
divorce reform movements that have availed women of greater economic rights); Owen M. 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.1. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement is not 
preferable to court judgments and should not be indiscriminately institutionalized or 
encouraged); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers/or Women, I 00 YALE 
L.1. 1545, 1551 (1991) (expressing concern about the ability to derive quality agreements 
through the process ofrnediation). 
63. Melton, supra note 7, at 2045-46. 
64. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 61, at 974; see also Folberg et aI., supra note 62, 
at 347. 
65. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse. Professional Language. and Legal Change in 
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 729 (1988). But see Ann Milne, 
Mediation-A Promising Alternative/or Family Courts, 42 Juv. & FAM. Cr. 1., no. 2,1991, 
at 61, 72 (arguing that mediation is ideally suited to resolve complex conflicts between 
individuals who have a continuing relationship with each other, family law litigants). 
66. Fineman, supra note 65, at 770. 
67. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization a/Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443, 1444. 
68. [d. at 1446. 
69. [d. at 1559; see also Dailey, supra note 6, at 1861 (footnote omitted) (viewing family 
law "as the product of a normative discourse among a community of citizens living in a 
particular place at a particular time in history"). 
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task of family law jurisprudence to continue this tradition of imparting values 
necessitates a "revitalization of family law.,,70 This revitalization may require 
substantial changes to the manner in which courts currently address family legal 
issues, including restructuring the existing court system. Recent 
recommendations have called for states to create unified family courtS/I and 
some jurisdictions already have responded.72 While this effort represents a 
significant improvement in how courts address family legal matters, a novel and 
more expansive approach to the resolution of these issues in any context or court 
setting can fundamentally reform family law decisionmaking. Irrespective of the 
particular court structure or setting, family law decisionmakers must consider 
factors beyond their. conceptions of the family and account for the "family 
ecology.'>7l Examination of the neighborhoods, religious organizations, and other 
associations or institutions within which family members participate can provide 
this broader context for decisionmakers. These institutions represent mediating 
structures that influence families and on which families must rely to perform 
their nurturing and caregiving functions.'4 In order to assist families by 
promoting their well-being through family law decisionmaking, judges must 
account for and attempt to strengthen various aspects of families' environments 
or ecologies: 
There is at present in legal discourse little recognition that family members 
may need nurturing environments as much as they need rights, or that 
families themselves may need surrounding communities in order to function 
at their best. By systematically-though for the most part 
unintentionally-ignoring the "little platoons" from which families and 
individuals have always drawn emotional and material sustenance, modern 
legal systems probably contribute to some extent to their atrophy.7s 
70. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEx. L. REv. 
245,280 (1990) (reviewing GLENDON, supra note 13). 
71. See AB.A PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON TIlE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN 
AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 
54 (1993) (recommending the establishment of unified family courts in all states); see also 
Mary Wechsler, Unified Family Courts, in 2 THE CONFERENCE CALL, Summer 1995, at 1 
(reporting on a national conference of bar presidents, which group called for the creation of 
unified family courts). 
72. Since 1994, three state legislatures have authorized the creation of family courts within 
the entire state or within selected areas of each state. See 1996 MD. LAWS 13; 1995 N.H. LAWS 
152:2; VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie 1995). 
73. GLENDON, supra note 13, at 308; see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 248 ("The 
courts' functioning must be put in a social context, as part of a web of institutions that enable 
people to live together peaceabl[y]. We have leamed to see legal institutions as part of a larger 
ecology in which various dispute institutions interact and effect [sic] one another."). 
74. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 27, at 2-6. The authors argue that neighborhoods, 
families, churches, and voluntary associations, among other institutions affecting an 
individual's private life, must be empowered wherever possible in place of governmental 
agencies to accomplish social goals, as opposed to defending the individual against these 
institutions. 
75. GLENDON, supra note 13, at 308. 
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Knowledge ga~ned from social sciences relevant to family issues can assist with 
developing this expanded focus for decisionmakers.76 In addition, competence 
in a variety of disciplines, particularly for those engaged in family law, is critical 
for family law to achieve legal realism, or to become more reflective of and 
responsive to social realities.77 
II. THE CASE FOR AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK IN 
F AMIL Y LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
The challenge for those charged with resolving family law issues in a 
responsive manner becomes how to consider the institutions composing the 
family ecology. Application of a theoretical research paradigm from the social 
sciences, known as "the ecology of human development,,,78 can facilitate 
"functional integration,,79 between social science and public policy. 
76. See SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY 
BREAKDOWN 146-47 (1971); see also Joan S. Meier, Notesfrom the Underground: Integrating 
Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 
HOFSTRAL. REv. 1295, 1308-09 (1993) (footnote omitted); Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, 
at 1214; Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the 
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 
191,191 (Stephen D. Sugarman & HermaHill Kay eds., 1990). Joan Meier shows how, in the 
domestic violence context, social science research has elucidated for legislative policy makers 
the impact of spouse abuse on children living in a home where that domestic violence occurs. 
''Numerous states and the United States Congress have in the last few years passed legislation 
calling for state courts to consider evidence of spouse abuse in custody determinations, thereby 
mandating a transformation in traditional judicial approaches to the issue." Meier, supra at 
1309 (footnote omitted). 
77. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice 
to Life, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1977, 1991 (1993). The author finds that this interdisciplinary 
competence "cannot be dismissed as simply a professorial predilection for dabbling. To the 
contrary, at least in family law, interdisciplinary studies are not a distraction from, but a critical 
part of, modern lawyering. It would be futile to isolate legal doctrine and practice from 
psychology, economics, sociology, religion, and history .... " !d.; see also Meier, supra note 
76, at 1297 (suggesting that the subject of domestic violence encompasses the disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, public policy, criminology, medicine, public health, and law); Sarah 
H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and 
Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 632 (1994) 
(acknowledging that "[s]ocial science research can make a valuable contribution to family law 
analysis and formation. It can help define problems, identifY possible solutions, and challenge 
underlying normative assumptions"). 
78. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 21. 
79. !d. at 8-9. Bronfenbrenner defines this functional integration as follows: 
Knowledge and analysis of social policy are essential for progress in 
developmental research because they alert the investigator to those aspects of the 
environment, both immediate and more remote, that are most critical for the 
cognitive, emotional, and social development of the person. Such knowledge and 
analysis can lay bare ideological assumptions underlying, and sometimes 
profoundly limiting, the formulation of research problems and designs and thus 
the range of possible findings. 
Id. at 8. 
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A. An Explanation of the Ecology of Human Development 
as a Theoretical Model 
In order to understand how and why family law jurisprudence can benefit by 
application of a perspective that draws on the wealth of knowledge social 
scientists can contribute to the resolution of family conflict, it is necessary to 
understand exactly what that perspective is. This section outlines the relevant 
theoretical underpinnings of Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner's ecology of human 
development, one goal of which is to provide a comprehensive paradigm to study 
how human development occurs. This social science model promotes an 
understanding of the interaction among individuals, institutions, and the social 
environment, thus helping to identify problems and to propose solutions.80 The 
ecological perspective strives to strengthen these interactions and 
interconnections in order to improve the world in which families and children 
function. 81 
Bronfenbrenner's overriding thesis is that "[t]he family is the most humane, 
efficient and economical system for making human beings human known to 
man.,,82 Thus, for Bronfenbrenner, the interactions between a child and his family 
are the main focus of human development. Bronfenbrenner studies how the 
child's immediate interactions with family members, as well as the child's and 
his family members' interactions within other settings of their lives, such as the 
school and the workplace, influence the child's development. He suggests ways 
to strengthen the child's and family members' development by pursuing 
strategies designed to establish connections among all the competing influences 
on children and families. The perspective assumes that the functioning of 
children and families can be enhanced and, consequently, human development 
80. GARY B. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND IN1ERVENTIONS 64 
(1983); see also GARY B. MELTON ET AL., COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE 
COURTS: AN EVALUATION OF COMMUNJTY-BASED FORENSIC SERVICES (1985). This book offers 
a comprehensive examination of the relationship between the mental health professions and the 
legal system, with suggestions for strengthening that relationship. 
8!. James Garbarino & Robert H. Abramowitz, Sociocultural Risk and Opportunity, in 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 35 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1992). Application of an ecological perspective may present challenges: 
It would be easy to cast aside the many interconnections and pretend that there is 
just the developing child, or just the family as a social unit, or just the community 
power structure, or just the professional delivering human services. It would be 
easy, but we believe it would not be enough. Rather, we seek to capture the whole 
tangled mass' of relationships connecting child, family, and social environment. 
James Garbarino & Mario T. Gaboury, An Introduction, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE 
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 1 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992) (emphasis in original). 
82. American Families: Trends and Pressures. 1973: Hearings on Examination of the 
Influence that Governmental Policies Have on American Families Before the Subcomm. on 
Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 134, 179 
(1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Urie Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Human 
Development and Family Studies and Psychology, College of Human Ecology, Cornell 
University). 
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may be improved by strengthening the quality and quantity of relationships and 
of interactions among systems. 
The paradigm devisedby Bronfenbrenner is unique in that it focuses on human 
development outside the research laboratory and in situations regularly occurring 
in the environment that present risks or opportunities to individuals, such as 
within families, among friendship groups, within neighborhoods, at schools, and 
within communities.83 "It sees the social environment as a grand human 
experiment, and thus invites our efforts to improve it, to make it better.,,84 
Bronfenbrenner arranges the situations or contexts within which individuals live 
their lives on a scale from smallest to largest. He sees a person's experience "as 
a set of nested structures, each inside the next, like a set of Russian dolls." 85 He 
labels the most immediate context within which development occurs as the 
"microsystem,,,86 comprised of the settings in which the individual experiences 
daily reality, such as the parent-child relationship, the husband-wife relationship, 
and the child-teacher relationship. 
For Bronfenbrenner, the next level of interaction within which development 
occurs is the "mesosystem,,,87 or the relationships between those contexts or 
microsystems in which a person experiences reality. For example, consideration 
of the mesosystem involves determining the amount of interconnectedness 
between a child's school and his home setting, or between a child's home and 
church setting, or between a child's school and the neighborhood setting. "The 
central principle here is that the stronger and more complementary the links 
between settings, the more powerful the reSUlting mesosystem will be as an 
influence on the child's development. A rich range of mesosystems is both a 
product and a cause of development.,,88 
The next largest system affecting human development Bronfenbrenner labels 
the "exosystem,,,S9 or those settings that have power over one's life, yet in which 
one does not participate. For example, a parent's place of employment or peer 
group has an influence on the child's life, even though the child is not directly 
involved in those experiences.9o 
83. Garbarino & Gaboury, supra note 81, at 4. 
84.Id. at3. 
85. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 3. 
86.Id. at 7,22. 
87. [d. at 7-8, 25. 
88. James Garbarino & Robert H. Abramowitz, The Ecology of Human Development, in 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN TIlE SOCIAL ENvIRONMENT 11, 26 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d 
ed.1992). 
89. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 7-8, 25. 
90. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 57, at 1113-14 (discussing the effect of family roles and 
responsibilities on workplace participation, as well as how the workplace structures family 
life); see also Fineman, supra note 5, at 2184 ("Altered expectations and aspiratigns about 
equality and economic opportunity have been the impetus for many individual women to 
change the ways they practice mothering. On a societal level, these changes have generated 
reconsideration of the meaning and implications of motherhood."). An example of exosystem 
effects exists in the following: 
The effects of divorce, nonpayment of child support, foster-care, restrictions on 
marriage, and numerous other aspects of family life on the national economy are 
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Finally, "[m]eso- and exosystems are set within the broad ideological and 
institutional patterns of a particular culture or subculture. These are the 
macrosystems. Thus, macrosystems are the 'blueprints' for the ecology of human 
development. These blueprints reflect a people's shared assumptions about 'how 
things should be done.",91 The macrosystem ideology or social policy creates 
various risks and opportunities for the individual. In defining macrosystem risk 
and opportunity, "macro system risk is any social pattern or societal event that 
impoverishes the ability and willingness of adults to care for children and 
children to learn from adults, while opportunity is the social pattern or event that 
encourages and supports parents and children.,,92 An example of macrosystem 
risk is a national economic policy that contributes to child and family poverty; 
an example of macrosystem opportunity is a national policy that values families 
by giving economic incentives for families with young children.93 
Bronfenbrenner espouses a phenomenologIcal approach, in that researchers 
must examine the meanings that aspects of the environment have for the person 
within a given context or setting and between or among those contexts.94 He also 
recognizes that over the course of a lifetime, situations may change in their 
effects on individuals and families, thereby imposing a life-course perspective 
on the study of families and children.95 
Nonetheless, "[t]he most important thing about this ecological perspective is 
that it reveals connections that might otherwise go unnoticed and helps us look 
beyond <the immediate and the obvious to see where the most significant 
influences lie.,,96 Bronfenbrenner argues that these naturally-occurring 
interactions or interconnections can be strengthened to enhance individual and 
widely documented. Indeed, it is arguable that no institution has more direct links 
to the economic, social and political well-being of this country than the family. 
Dailey, supra note 6, at 1819 (footnote omitted). 
91. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 27 (emphasis in original). 
92. Id. at 28. 
93.Id. 
94. Garbarino & Gaboury, supra note 81, at 9-10; Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 
88, at 29-30. 
95. Id. The following illustrates the need for a life-course perspective: 
Since most data are a cross-sectional snapshot of families, families are assumed 
to be static. A more realistic (though much more difficult) approach is to 
recognize and analyze the fluidity, change, and transitions as individuals live in 
a variety of family patterns. There are periods in the life cycle when an individual 
family may be one in which the father works and the mother stays home with the 
children. This stage is relatively short-lived when the total family life course is 
analyzed. There are periods, also, when women (and men) find themselves raising 
a family without.a spouse present, but again, for many this is a transition period. 
None of these types or stages, however, should be viewed as the dominant or 
"ideal" family type. No one family type is superior to another or to be favored 
over others. Effective policies and services should be sensitive to the needs and 
stresses of certain types of families and recognize that some families are at greater 
risk (statistically) than others. 
ROBERT M. MARONEY, FAMILIES, SOCIAL SERVICES, AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE ISSUE OF SHARED 
RESPONSIBILITY 50 (1980). 
96. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 19. 
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family development.97 He suggests that the crucial question becomes whether we 
can change social institutions so that they can function as positive influences on 
the lives of the families and children" with whom they intera~t by increasing the 
quantity and quality of individuals' and families' connections among the systems 
of his paradigm.98 Also, since each level of functioning can produce either 
positive or negative effects, either opportunities or risks, it is important to assess 
the impact of each system on individuals and families: 99 
[The researcher's task is to determine] how the essential functions of the 
parent [at each level of functioning] are supported, encouraged, 
supplemented, and reviewed by people with a long-term investment in the 
welfare and well-being of the child. A truly poor child is one whose parents 
are left to their own devices, particularly when those devices are too limited 
for the difficult task of rearing a child. A poor child is one who is 
unprotected. A rich child is one whose life is full of diverse and enduring 
relationships and whose parents are similarly involved in an interlocking web 
of supportive, nurturant, and concerned relationships. The higher the personal 
risk of the child, the greater the importance of sociocultural resources. The 
principal task for the community is to know how socially well-fixed their 
families are and to proceed accordingly. The community needs to recognize 
positive forces where they exist naturally (and then leave them alone) and to 
learn how to generate and sustain them where they do not exist already. 100 
The ecological perspective, then, is vitally concerned with the reciprocal and 
functional relationship between social science and public policy.IOI 
In terms of fashioning responsive family law decisionmaking aimed at 
"creating a more human ecology,,,102 "the ecological perspective on human 
development offers a kind of map for steering a course of study and 
intervention."IOl This perspective leads to a recognition of family law 
97. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 214. But see MoncrieffCochran et aI., Personal 
Networks and Public Policy, in EXTENDING FAMILIES: THE SOCIAL NElWORKS OF PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN 307, 310 (Moncrieff Cochran et al. eds., 1990) (mentioning that the policy 
focus of most family support programs has involved the creation of "additions to the local 
social ecology," or creating new programs such as domestic violence shelters and parenting 
classes). 
98. Hearings, supra note 82, at 157 (statement ofUrie Bronfenbrenner). 
99. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 28. 
100. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 81, at 65-66. 
101. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 130. "Public policy questions are relevant for 
basic science primarily because they can alert the researcher to aspects ofthe immediate and, 
especially, the more remote environment that affect developmental processes and outcomes." 
ld As an example, Bronfenbrenner's own experiences as a researcher have determined a social 
policy designed to enhance human development, in that he was a founder of Project Head Start: 
[P]ublic policy has the power to affect the well-being and development of 
human beings by determining the conditions of their lives. This realization led to 
my heavy involvement during the past fifteen years in efforts to change, develop, 
and implement policies in my own country that could influence the lives of 
children and families. 
ld. at xiii; see also Head Start Act § 105,42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-52(a) (1994). 
102. Elizabeth M. Eddy, Book Review, 83 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 643 (1981) (reviewing 
BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10). 
103. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 28. 
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jurisprudence as more than a mechanism for domestic dispute resolution. 
Application of the ecology of human development paradigm to family law 
decisionmaking can assist judges to identify the complex factors affecting 
families' lives. Equipped with this expanded knowledge and consistent with 
notions of the law's need to promote social welfare, family law decisionmakers 
can use the law's power to more effectively intervene in families' and children's 
lives. Adoption of this ecological framework thus compels the need for an 
interdisciplinary approach to family law jurisprudence. 
B. The Existing Relevance oj Social Science 
A willingness to cross scholarly boundaries and to engage in interdisciplinary 
study or collaboration does not distract from the focus offamily law; instead, it 
enriches and clarifies that perspective. What is it that social science can offer the 
field of law in general and family law in particular? 
[S]ocial science is often the best source available for descriptive and 
explanatory knowledge. It is undertaken systematically, with care for 
methodological soundness and concern for objectivity. Social science tries 
to build a cumulative understanding of the ways in which the world works. 
Thus it provides both descriptive "facts" about a situation and understanding 
of cause-effect linkages (Le., the theories underlying policy action). As its 
findings move into public view, they tend to reshape the images we all hold 
of the social world. 104 
The complex and technical nature of our society prompts this need to utilize 
several professions and disciplines. lOS 
Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in the late nineteenth century that a better 
understanding of the social world must inform our knowledge oflegal rules in 
order to effectuate rational justice. 106 At that time, classical jurisprudence, or 
adjudicating through a process of mechanical deductive logic and immutable law, 
dominated the legal system.107 Legal realists revolted against this notion of 
opposition to change in the law,108 consistent with their belief that law must 
reflect social reality, 109 a jurisprudential philosophy that prevails today. Thus, a 
reliance on social science llo to provide that better understanding of the social 
world advocated by Holmes is appropriate. 
104. Carol H. Weiss, The Diffusion of Social Science Research to Policymakers: An 
Overview, in REFoRMING THE LAW: IMPACf OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH 63, 72 (Gary 
B. Melton ed., 1987). 
105. Lynn M. Akre, Comment, Struggling with Indeterminacy: A Call for Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration in Redefining the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 628, 
629 (1992). 
106. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). 
107. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining. Evaluating. and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479 (1986). 
108. Id. at 482. 
109. Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 1214. 
110. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 479. Here, social science is defined as "the 
application of empirical research methods to questions of human behavior." Id. at 479 n.4. 
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The United States Supreme Court first relied on social science research at the 
turn of the century, III and the Court only began to rely with any frequency on 
such evidence within the last forty years. 112 State courts, on the other hand, still 
appear reluctant to rely on the use of social science data. I 13 
A focus on the application of social science to the law recently has become 
more visible.1I4 Familiarity with social science can assist in honing lawyers' 
insights and analyses. liS Social science fosters the development of an "empirical 
'frame of reference.'" 116 The application of social science to the law can range 
from its relevance in the creation of a rule of law pursuant to the notion of social 
authority, to the resolution of a specific case, or to the suggestion of a broad-
based decisionmaking perspective or frame of reference, as espoused in this 
Article. 
A specific example of the relevance of interdisciplinary study to the field of 
family law arises in the determination of child custody cases. A better 
understanding of child development, including the various developmental needs 
1 I 1. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), as discussed in Monahan & Walker, supra note 
107, at 477 & n.1. 
112. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Gary B. Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on 
the Judiciary, in REFORMING TIlE LAW: IMPACf OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH 27, 54 
(Gary B. Melton ed., 1987); see also Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 484. But see 
Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court's Continuing 
Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279 (1995) (discussing 
cases where the Supreme Court has misused social science research or has refused to rely on 
relevant social science data). 
I 13. Hafem~ister & Melton, supra note 112, at 54-55; see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption 
by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL 'y 207 (1995) (detailing how courts have considered social science research 
to grant and to deny adoptions by gay and lesbian parents, as well as how opponents to these 
adoptions often have misrepresented this social science data); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption 
of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. 
GENDERL. &POL'Y 191 (1995) (concluding there is no evidence from social science research 
to support arguments and court decisions that gay and lesbian parents' adopting children harms 
the adoptees, rendering adoptive parents' sexual orientation an irrelevant consideration in 
adoption proceedings). 
114. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
at v (3d ed. 1994). The authors define their work as a "traditional law school casebook, albeit 
on a non-traditional topic" that seeks to convince readers of the relevance of social science in 
American law. Id. A work summarizing papers and dialogues related to the Conference on the 
UselNonuselMisuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts held in Washington, D.C. in 
1978 describes the relationship between law and social science: 
The papers and dialogues contained in this volume reflect the current state of 
interchange between the applied social research community and the legaUjudicial 
community. That relationship is marked by mutual ignorance and 
misunderstanding, but also by the promise of more and better utilization of social 
research findings in the courts. Use of such findings in a legal context has 
increased considerably in recent years and will almost certainly continue to do so. 
Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron, Preface to THE USEINONUSEIMISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL 
REsEARCH IN TIlE COURTS at ix (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978). 
115. MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 114, at v. 
116. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 488 nAO. 
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and stages of children, may help decisionmakers reach more appropriate 
outcomes in child custody cases.1I7 This follows from the proposition that the 
most appropriate source of child development information is the social science 
expert. 118 In addition, the use of social scientific guidelines or findings regarding 
child development can serve as the basis for factors judges should consider in 
custody cases,1I9 thereby limiting judges' discretion in these matters. In this 
manner, social science research can contribute to the field of family law by 
providing scientific alternatives to individualized judicial discretion. 120 
Yet another area of family law appropriate for the introduction of social 
science research is divorce. Because some judges misconstrue divorce as a one-
time event rather than an ongoing process in the parties' lives,t21 social science 
research can assist the court's decisionmaking by contributing studies 
documenting the long-term psychological effects of divorce on the parties and 
on their children. 122 These studies can guide judges to consider the many 
I 17. Akre, supra note 105, at 628; see also Elovitz, supra note II3, at 207; Patterson, supra 
note 113, at 191. 
118. Akre, supra note 105, at 629. 
II 9. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses 0/ Social Science Data in Legal 
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 107; see also Elizabeth 
Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984) (providing an 
empirical examination of joint custody arrangements and proposing a legal rule to limit the 
authority of judges to order joint custody to those cases wherein the parties voluntarily agree). 
120. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 109. 
121. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 20, at 19. Maccoby and Mnookin discuss four 
relationships that become transformed by divorce: 
In the spousal divorce the intimacy-sexual, psychological, and social-between 
husband and wife must be brought to an end. The economic divorce requires that 
the previous economic relationship based on a single household be transformed. 
The parental divorce requires the spouses to redefine their respective parental 
roles because of the new arrangements required for the children. And the legal 
divorce requires a process aimed at producing a written document specifying the 
custodial and financial arrangements that will govern after the dissolution. 
Though interconnected, these four aspects of divorce involve different processes, 
and they may differ greatly in how difficult they are for a couple to manage. 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Akre, supra note 105, at 638. 
122. See E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Family Transitions: Winners, Losers, and 
Survivors, 60 CHILD DEV. I (1989). The author found in a longitudinal study that individual 
characteristics of children, interpersonal family dynamics, and factors external to the family 
(such as a child's peer relationships) interact to affect any consequences to children resulting 
from their parents' change in marital status. In addition, any negative consequences subside 
within two to three years after divorce if there is not continued family stress. Id.; see also 
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (I 980) (exhaustive studies on the effects of divorce and 
remarriage on children and parents); Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects 
0/ Ideology and Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United 
States, 2 INT'L J.L. &FAM. 106, 117-18 (1988) (summarizing studies concerning the effects of 
mediation of child custody proceedings on children's well-being); E. Mavis Hetherington & 
Kathleen A. Camara, Families in Transition: The Process o/Dissolution and Reconstitution, 
in 7 REv. CHILD DEV. REs. 398 (Ross D. Parke ed., I 984) (examining the effects of divorce and 
subsequent transitions in family life on changes in the parent-child relationship and in the 
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influences on the participants' adjustment to the divorce process, as well as how 
that adjustment may affect other aspects of their lives, such as the academic 
performance of their children. 123 This knowledge allows judges to understand the 
effects of their decisions on individuals' and families' lives. 
Family law reform projects illustrate other applications of social science 
research with a focus beyond assisting in the determination of an individual case. 
Examples include the creation of child support guidelines,124 analyses of the 
effectiveness of wage withholding in increasing and collecting child support 
awards,125 identification of the concept of achieving timely permanent placements 
for children in foster care, 126 and more general studies of the impact of foster care 
on children. 127 
While the advantages to applying social science research findings in family law 
decisionmaking are many, justifications for a cautious approach to this 
relationships between adults, as well as discussing resources available to assist families in 
transition}; Joan B. Kelly, Current Research on Children's Postdivorce Adjustment; 31 F AM. 
& CONCILIATION CrS. REv. 29 (1993) (reviewing current research concerning the effects on 
children of marital conflict, parental adjustment to divorce and separation, custody 
arrangements, and parental access to children). 
123. Akre, supra note 105, at 643; Hetherington, supra note 122; Hetherington & Camara, 
supra note 122; see also SCOTI' W. HENGGELER & CHARLES M. BORDUIN, F AMIL Y THERAPY 
AND BEYOND at vii (1990) (discussing the contributions of family systems theory, which sees 
behavior as a result of interactions among family members, to more effective approaches to 
interventions in the family and arguing for a multi-systemic approach to such interventions); 
Robert E. Emery & Michele Tuer, Parenting and the Marital Relationship, in PARENTING: AN 
EcOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 123-25 (Tom Laster & Lynn Okagaki eds., 1993) (providing 
a general explanation of family systems theory and family life cycle development). For an 
example of an integrated systems approach to court reform, see William D. Mccoll, Comment, 
Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. 
L. REv. 467, 502 (1996) (discussing the interactions of the legal, correctional, and medical 
systems in the recently-created drug court). 
124. Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in Family Law 
Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24 FAM. L.Q. 157, 166-70 
(1990). 
125. See Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 632 n.l. 
126. Herring, supra note 26, at 206-08 (arguing for a new approach to achieve timely 
permanent placements for children in foster care based upon a political role of the American 
family). 
127. MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (1988); 
Martin Guggenheim, The Efficts of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental 
Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 
133-34 (1995) (finding that involuntary termination of parental rights has resulted in a record 
number of children available for adoption but not yet adopted); see also LJ. v. Massinga, 838 
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming a preliminary injunction on behalf of present or former 
foster children in the custody of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services to redress 
deficiencies in the administration of the foster care program and finding that city and state 
officials administering the program were not immune from damages for their actions or 
inactions); Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effict 
on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 F AM. L.Q. 233,246 (1986) (suggesting 
that legal reforms designed to achieve permanency for children in foster care have not achieved 
these goals and proposing strategies for attorneys involved in foster care cases). 
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application exist. 128 One concern about the use of social science research is that 
those attempting to apply the research may not have kept up with the literature 
in the field and may not be as informed as possible regarding the social science 
discipline. 129 Another fear is that users of social science research may 
misinterpret the findings or may apply the information in the wrong context. 130 
In addition, judges and lawyers may give undue emphasis to social science 
findings as a means to justify their arguments and conclusions in the difficult 
area offamily law decisionmaking.13I Finally, incorporating and applying social 
science research may serve to mask a political or value-laden approach to family 
law decisionmaking and, instead, to treat it as a scientific approach. 132 
Lawyers, judges, and policymakers who look to social science for assistance 
in their work can address these inherent dangers. Primarily, it is incumbent upon 
these users of social science research to thoroughly understand the particular 
limitations and applications of any social science studies. 133 In addition, in the 
same manner as family law decisionmaking reflects values and biases of 
decisionmakers, users of social science findings must ascertain the particular 
personal biases and values of the social science researcher. 
When aeciding whether to employ social science research, potential users of 
such research must question whether the findings are ready for application in a 
particular legal forum, a determination about which there are no strict rules. 134 
In evaluating the scientific strength and relevance of social science studies, 
however, asking the following questions about the research offers useful 
assistance: "How strong are the findings ... ? How much disagreement exists in 
the field? How appropriate is generalization from the laboratory to the specific 
128. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 113; Akre, supra note 105, at 663-65; Fineman & Opie, 
supra note 119, at 107-08; Statement of Sue Johnson, in THE USFJNONUSEIMISUSE OF APPLIED 
SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE COURTS 40-41 (Michael 1. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978); 
Gary B. Melton, Judicial Notice of "Facts" about Child Development, in REFORMING THE 
LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH 232, 239-40 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987). 
129. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 108. 
130. /d.; see Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 654-55. 
131. See Melton, supra note 128, at 240 (suggesting that it may be difficult by any means 
to educate judges about family life and child development). 
132. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 110. In works particularly appropriate for the 
education of professionals in the law, other scholars have suggested extensive frameworks for 
assessing the validity, reliability, and overall methodological soundness of social science 
research. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social 
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORYL.1. 1005, 1009-10 (1989); Ramsey & 
Kelly, supra note 77, at 634. 
133. See Faigman, supra note 132, at 1009, 1080-82. 
134. Lois A. Weithorn, Professional Responsibility in the Dissemination of Psychological 
Research in Legal Contexts, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 
REsEARCH 253, 260-61 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987). But see Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), where the Court established criteria that scientific evidence must 
meet for admissibility in federal court. A court must examine (1) whether the technique has 
been empirically tested; (2) whether the technique has undergone peer review and publication; 
(3) the error rate of the technique; and (4) the general acceptance of the technique among the 
appropriate scientific community. Id. at 593-94. The test looks at the validity of research 
techniques and the methodology.ld at 592-93. 
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legal context in which the legal findings will be applied?,,13S In addition, those 
seeking to utilize social science research must weigh the potential benefits to 
society against any harm resulting from application of the research.136 Finally, 
users of social science findings must evaluate the conceptual framework of the 
study, the appropriateness of the methodology, alternative explanations for the 
conclusions, and whether the conclusions are consistent with other research. 137 
One suggestion to combat some of the criticisms leveled at social science 
methodology, including a purported failure of some social science studies to 
account for important variables or factors that do not fit within a rational or 
objective framework,us is a suggestion that research be a "'collaborative' 
endeavor.,,139 For example, in the law reform context, interdisciplinary 
collaboration allows those interested in reform to review social science research, 
either policy-oriented or theory-oriented, and to make decisions about the utility 
of the research. 140 It permits those knowledgeable in family law to identify and 
apply social science research relevant to documented legal problems. 141 
Collaborative research and reform also assist social scientists, who can rely on 
their legal colleagues to identify issues and frame questions for research. 142 
While the debate about the role of social science in the law is likely to 
continue, attempts at cooperation and collaboration between the disciplines can 
strengthen the bond.143 This increased interaction can benefit both professions 
by revealing linkages among the law, social science research, families, and 
children. 144 Adopting the ecology of human development as a theoretical 
framework for family law jurisprudence can inform and improve the 
effectiveness of this collaborative effort, with an outcome of improved family 
law decisionmaking. 
135. Weithom, supra note 134, at 260-61. 
136. [d. at 261; see also Bersoff & Glass, supra note 112, at 293-301 (discussing cases 
where the Supreme Court has refused to rely on relevant social science data or has relied on 
irrelevant or misapplied findings); Elovitz, supra note 113, at 217-20 (discussing how courts 
have considered social science research to grant and to deny adoptions by gay and lesbian 
parents). 
137. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 669. 
138. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 115. 
139. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 129 (emphasis added). 
140. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 675. 
141. Id. at 683. 
142. Id.; see, e.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE 
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (1987) (providing 
an exhaustive summary and blueprint of the roles of mental health professionals and lawyers 
in a wide variety oflegal actions, including juvenile delinquency, child abuse and neglect, and 
child custody in divorce); see also Statement of Charles H. Baron, in THE UsEIMISUSElNONUSE 
OF APPLIED SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE COURTS 154, 156 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron 
eds., 1978) ("Once social scientists become an intimate part of this adversary system, they will 
be able to suggest changes in the system from a more informed point of view and with more 
credibility .... "). 
143. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 684. 
144.Id. 
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C. Adopting a Therapeutic Perspective 
Family law adjudication by definition involves court intervention in the lives 
of families and children. In contrast to social science, law "does not describe 
how people do behave, but rather prescribes how they shouldbehave.,,14s Thus, 
the following questions become pertinent: 
How deeply into the domestic realm can or should government go when 
it intervenes in the lives of families and children? Conversely, what is 
government's duty to families and children who are in legal and social 
distress? These political and philosophical questions stilI bedevil public 
officials in America today. Yet when society chooses to intervene, it must be 
done well and there must be accountability. 146 
The notion of intervention implies an ability to influence the underlying 
situation to make it more positive.147 In family law adjudication, one function of 
court intervention ought to aim to improve the participants' underlying behavior 
or situation. 148 Application of "therapeutic jurisprudence" 149 to family law can 
assist with this improvement effort. The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence 
emerges from the field of mental health law, where it is defined as follows: 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may 
produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Such consequences 
may flow from substantive rules, legal procedures, or from the behavior of 
legal actors (lawyers or judges). 
145. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 489 (footnote omitted). 
146. Michael A. Town, The Unified Family Court: Therapeutic Justice for Families and 
Children I (Mar. II, 1994) (transcript available in Chicago Bar Association Building). 
147. Irving E. Sigel, The Ethics of Intervention, in CHANGING FAMILIES 1, 8-9 (Irving E. 
Sigel & Luis M. Laosa eds., 1983). 
148. See Donald B. King, Accentuate the Positive-Eliminate the Negative, 31 FAM. & 
CONCILIATIONCrS. REv. 9 (1993); see also Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good 
Children, 14 L. & INEQ. 1. 489, 501 (1996) (arguing that American families face an uncertain 
future, such that "[t]he need to strengthen and stabilize them seems obvious and calls for a 
change in legal perspective"). 
149. Wexler, supra note II, at 8; see also David B. Wexler & Bruce 1. Winick, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 979, 989 (1991) ("The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective can provide a 
useful lens through which to view an existing body ofliterature in order to discover new value 
and applications."). A focus on the therapeutic aspects of jurisprudence calls for an expanded 
notion of jurisprudence: 
To speak of the therapeutic in ajurisprudential sens~o speak of it as a possible 
form of public discourse in any sense-may seem strange to many, because at first 
blush the very concept of the therapeutic would seem to be unremittingly private. 
After all, therapy is, or once was, based upon the concept of a wholly private 
space in which patient and therapist would explore, and perhaps remodulate, 
aspects of personality. 
Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1062, 1081 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
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The task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to 
examine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and 
therapeutic outcomes. The research task is a cooperative and thoroughly 
interdisciplinary one .... Such research should then usefully inform policy 
determinations regarding law reform. ISO 
799 
The goal of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests a need to restructure the law and 
the legal process by applying behavioral science knowledge to accomplish 
therapeutic outcomes without interfering with traditional notions of justice. lSI 
The potential exists to apply therapeutic jurisprudence to family law.152 
In the family law context, this concept of the law as a therapeutic agent is 
particularly relevant to situations where families experience intra- or inter-family 
crisis. Envisioning the court's role in these family crisis situations as that of 
facilitating more positive relationships or outcomes and of strengthening 
families' functioning, or a "prescriptive focus,,,15J seems particularly appropriate. 
Liberalized divorce lawsl54 have encouraged a therapeutic focus by some 
professionals involved in these cases, thereby providing an example of the 
relevance of therapeutic jurisprudence to family law. As the legal focus in these 
divorce cases has shifted away from questions of fault surrounding marital 
breakup, the mental health profession's emphasis has centered on the effects of 
divorce on family members.1SS In turn, these professionals have advocated 
150. Wexler, supra note 11, at 8 (footnote omitted). 
151. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 279, 280 (1993). A focus on therapeutic jurisprudence may assist with law 
reform efforts: 
When there is a substantial literature available, this type of research ... basically 
relates a body of relevant behavioral science to a body of law and explores the fit 
between the two; in the process, certain legal schemes and arrangements may 
stand out as comporting particularly well with therapeutic interests, and others 
may seem less satisfactory from a therapeutic viewpoint. If the therapeutically-
appropriate legal arrangements are not normatively objectionable on other 
grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform. 
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Research Tool, in 
EsSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 303 (David B. Wexler & Bruce 1. Winick eds., 1991). 
152. Wexler, supra note 151, at 281. 
153. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. &L. 17,21 (1993). 
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
155. The social work profession now has an expanded role relative to many family legal 
proceedings: 
As the number of families going through the legal process has increased, social 
workers have become involved in an attempt to make the process less adversarial 
so that family ties can continue. Counselors and therapists, who worked in roles 
supportive of the adjudicative function, have become more central to the family 
dissolution process. 
Calm, supra note 57, at 1091-92 (footnote omitted). 
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therapeutic intervention in the legal aspects of divorce in an attempt to transform 
the process to a more positive experience. ls6 
This therapeutic focus in divorce served as the basis for many states to create 
conciliation courts with the advent of the liberalized divorce laws. These courts 
provided separated or divorcing couples with marital counseling.ls7 States 
justified the creation of the courts by asserting their need to provide services to 
families to ease the families' crises. ISS The role of the court system was 
therapeutic in that the system attempted to assist families to adjust more 
positively to the post-divorce context. IS9 The therapeutic focus, however, stalled 
in the 1960s due to an inability to reconcile the focus with the advocacy process 
and to a concern about cost.160 
Family law jurisprudence can adopt and expand this service-oriented and 
therapeutic focus. To accomplish this family law reform, a significant part of the 
task becomes creating a jurisprudential model that assists judges to fashion 
therapeutic interventions and outcomes for individuals and families. 
To establish criteria designed to enhance the therapeutic nature of any reform, 
family law reformers can look to proponents oftherapeutic jurisprudence in the 
field of mental health law. These reformers already have identified some of the 
issues to promote in constructing a therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm. Some 
of these issues include the ability of the reform to empower individuals by 
allowing them to learn self-determining behavior and acquire decisionmaking 
skills, as well as the ability of the reform to empower judges to exercise 
sufficient controls to minimize abuse of the therapeutic measures. 161 In the field 
of fan;lily law, therapeutic justice should strive to protect families and children 
from present and future harms, to reduce emotional turmoil, to promote family 
harmony or preservation, and to provide individualized and efficient, effective 
justice.162 
Incorporating the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence, however, raises 
questions about whether proponents of the therapeutic model are neutral, or 
whether they have a bias toward procedures and results designed to ensure their 
156. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 90; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 16-17 (discussing 
the efforts in California in the early 1960s of Professors Herma Hill Kay and Aidan Gough to 
restructure the divorce process to reduce hostility and to create a Family Court to "help couples 
divorce with the least possible harm"). But see, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital 
Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 519, 520 (1994) 
(proposing that "[t]herapeutic divorce represented compelled nondivorce, holding families 
together through 'directive' psychiatry"). 
157. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 151; see J. Herbie DiFonzo, Coercive Conciliation: Judge 
Paul W. Alexander and the Movement for Therapeutic Divorce, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 535 (1994) 
(detailing the historical development of therapeutic divorce reform and early family courts and 
suggesting why the effort stalled); DiFonzo, supra note 156, at 520 (tracing the origins of the 
no-fault divorce movement and the history of conciliation courts as precursors to more recent 
family courts). 
158. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 151. 
159. [d. at 152. 
160. DiFonzo, supra note 157, at 575. 
161. Wexler & Winick, supra note 151, at 309, 317. 
162. Town, supra note 146, at 3,21. 
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continued involvement in the resolution process.163 Applying therapeutic justice 
to family law also invites concerns about whether judges and lawyers should 
deviate from the traditional advocacy model of adjudication,l64 a system that can 
further splinter already fragmented family relationships due to the adversarial 
and protracted nature of many court proceedings. In resolving family law matters, 
where the parties have some degree of relationship to one another and likely need 
to continue their relationship to some extent, adjudication may not represent the 
most appropriate dispute resolution technique.16s On the other hand, recognizing 
that adjudication is available as even a last resort can compel the parties in family 
law proceedings to adopt less extreme positions and to negotiate or mediate as 
dispute resolution techniques. 166 Mediation itself "in related-party cases can 
prove a therapeutic process.,,167 
The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, or assessing the therapeutic impact 
of adjudication, 168 offers a useful philosophy around which to structure family 
law decisionmaking. Applying the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence does not 
mean that the law serves predominantly therapeutic ends, nor does it suggest that 
courts avoid other jurisprudential outcomes. An application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence to family law means that decisionmakers 'need to evaluate the 
therapeutic consequences of the application of substantive family law, as well as 
the therapeutic effects of court rules, practices, and procedures. 169 This concern 
about the therapeutic nature offamily law decisionmaking, in combination with 
the application of the ecology of human development paradigm, underlies the 
interdisciplinary approach to family law jurisprudence proposed in this Article. 
III. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW: AN ECOLOGICAL AND THERAPEUTIC PARADIGM FOR 
F AMIL Y LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
"The American macrosystem has evolved into one in which the judiciary is the 
arbitrator in most domains of family and community life.,,170 Thus, perhaps 
unwittingly, family law decisionmakers, including judges and masters, playa 
163. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 164. 
164. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 
18 (1990). 
165. Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a 
Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L. & SOC'Y REv. 371, 395 (1980). The authors 
criticize adjudication as a proper method offact-finding in "related-party" cases. Id. at 396. 
166.Id. at 399,400. 
167.Id. at 401. 
168. Wexler & Winick, supra note 149, at 981. 
169.Id. at 1004. 
170. James Garbarino et ai., Social Policy, Children, and Their Families, in CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 271,291 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992); 
see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 254 ("Increasingly, we depend on the secular legal system 
to tell us how to live."). 
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critical role in shaping social policy.171 Because the law compels parties involved 
in family legal matters to utilize the court system, the system has a corresponding 
responsibility to resolve these issues in a helpful way. 172 An approach to family 
law jurisprudence that structures decisionmaking by applying the ecology of 
human development paradigm, buttressed by notions of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, provides a functional family law jurisprudential model. This type 
of decisionmaking has the potential to facilitate problem-solving and to 
positively enhance the quality of parties' daily lives, thereby rendering a more 
effective outcome for individuals and families. 173 
The ecological perspective conceptualizes individual and family development 
as a process that occurs as a result of the nurturance and feedback that 
individuals receive on a daily basis from their interpersonal relationships. 174 To 
be effective as a family law decisionmaking model, advocates, parties, and 
human services providersl7s must identify for decisionmakers the types and 
strengths of the microsystem relationships within which people function, or the 
relationships between and among family members. In addition, decisionmakers 
need to understand family members' mesosystem relationships, or relationships 
between individuals and aspects of their immediate environment, such as 
neighborhoods, schools, and religious organizations. For example, in a custody 
proceeding, the judge needs to understand the degree of parental participation in 
their children's schooling. 
According to the ecological perspective, development also occurs both directly 
and indirectly as a result of influences outside the family, or resulting from 
macro system influences, such as the parents' employment setting.J76 As a 
171. Garbarino et ai., supra note 170, at 275-76 ("For our purposes, a policy is a statement 
or a set of statements intended to guide decisions, activities, or efforts that generally describe 
either desired (or undesired) outcomes and/or desired (or undesired) methods of achieving 
them."); see also DONALD L. HOROWm, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 56 (1977) (defining 
social policy as "policy designed to affect the structure of social norms, social relations, or 
social decisionmaking"); Opening Remarks of Clark C. Abt, in THE USEINONUSEIMISUSE OF 
APPLIED SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE COURTS 1 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978) 
(arguing that judicial intervention in social policy has been increasing to encompass social 
problem solving); MORONEY, supra note 12, at 2 ("[S]ocial policy is concerned with a search 
for and an articulation of social objectives and the means to achieve these."). 
172. See King, supra note 148, at 9; see also Younger, supra note 148, at 501-02. 
173. See HENGGELER& BORDUIN, supra note 123, at 28; see also Wexler & Winick, supra 
note 149, at 984 ("If the therapeutically appropriate legal arrangements are not normatively 
objectionable on other grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform.") 
(footnote omitted). 
174. James Garbarino & S. Holly Stocking, The Social Context o/Child Maltreatment, in 
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLEcr: DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING EFFECfIVE 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAMILIES I, 6 (James Garbarino & S. Holly Stocking eds., 1980). 
175. See James Garbarino & Florence N. Long, Developmental Issues in the Human 
Services, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 231, 232 (James Garbarino 
et ai. eds., 2d ed. 1992) ("The term 'human services' encompasses a broad range of activities, 
programs, and agencies designed to meet the physical, intellectual, and social-emotional needs 
of individuals and families. These services are encountered primarily in microsystems ... or 
mesosystems (e.g., referral or liaison between agencies)."). 
176. Garbarino & Stocking, supra note 174, at 4. 
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consequence, advocates themselves must understand and elucidate for 
decisionmakers the effects of macro system influences on the family. In a custody 
proceeding, for example, the judge needs to know time demands of parental 
employment relative to time available for parents to engage in child-rearing 
activities. 
Utilizing an ecological approach to family law jurisprudence implies that 
decisionmakers appreciate the importance of socially rich environments for 
family members, including environments that provide support to families and 
children through a mix of formal and informal relationships.177 In addition, 
decisionmakers must recognize the interactions of individuals within a system 
and between systems over time and across the course of a lifetime, as each 
system participant continually adjusts to the other.178 The responsibility of family 
law decisionmakers to foster supportive environments for individuals and 
families by adopting an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential framework, 
then, challenges decisionmakers to look beyond the individual litigants involved 
in any family law matter, to holistically examine the larger social environments 
in which the participants live, and to fashion legal remedies that strengthen a 
family's supportive relationships. Decisionmakers must attempt to facilitate 
linkages for the litigants between and among as many systems in their lives as 
possible. 
The adversarial nature of traditional methods of family law adjudication can 
further fragment the relationship between family law litigants. A court system 
that accommodates a range of dispute resolution techniques, including 
negotiation, mediation, and adjudication, is important to ecological and 
therapeutic family law jurisprudence. These methods enable judges to strike an 
appropriate balance between the parties' own resolution of a family legal matter 
by their private ordering or agreement and full court trial of family law issues. 
Judges must have the ability to direct the parties to the most effective dispute 
resolution techniques for their particular situation.179 
177. Id. at 3. 
178. Id. at 5. 
179. Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management. 
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 
255, 256 (1985). "A judge's duty has never been purely adjudication. Judges have long 
engaged in case and calendar management as welJ as court administration, mediation, 
regulation of the bar, and other professional activities." Id. at 261; see also Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982). Several justifications exist for the 
increasing use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in family law: 
Although thus far change exists more in the literature than in practice, the 
appropriate role in family law for extra-judicial procedures such as mediation, 
arbitration, and representation of both spouses by a single attorney is a subject of 
great interest Several factors account for this development. First, courts' 
resources have been strained by a dramatic increase in the amount of family 
litigation, and judicial time for the resolution of these disputes is seriously 
inadequate. Second, the capacity of adversary proceedings (the litigational model 
used in the United States) to handle these matters in a humane and effective 
fashion continues to be seriously questioned. FinalJy, the financial costs of 
litigation have become so burdensome that many people seek less costly 
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To positively affect family members' behavior, thereby achieving a therapeutic 
outcome, family law remedies must reflect an integrated approach to family legal 
issues. 180 This means that decisionmakers must consider all of the parties' related 
family legal proceedings,18I as well as all of the institutions or organizations 
potentially affecting the behavior of families and children, including the 
community, peer groups, educational institutions, and religious organizations. 
Judges must know the neighborhoods of the families and children whose lives the 
courts influence in order to conduct this mesosystem and exosystem analysis. 182 
This need for connection to the community also challenges the judiciary and the 
courts to become leaders in the community and to "attempt to build procedures, 
dispositions, and structures that foster extended-family and community 
responsibility.,,183 
alternatives. 
Bruch, supra note 122, at 115 (footnote omitted). An examination of the form of state statutes 
regarding custody mediation provides an example of how widespread the use of alternative 
dispute resolution techniques in family law has become: 
The majority of the [state] statutes [regarding custody mediation] are [sic] 
discretionary in nature, allowing for mediation upon the recommendation of the 
court or the request of one of the parties. Only eight states, including California, 
require the mediation of all contested custody issues. Some states are still in the 
process of implementing pilot programs in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
custody mediation prior to a full-scale commitment. 
Dane A. Gaschen, Note, Mandatory Custody Mediation: The Debate over Its Usefulness 
Continues, 10 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 469, 472 (1995) (finding that approximately 60% 
of the states have some form of custody mediation statute). On the other hand, judges must 
understand the social science research documenting the coercive and anti-therapeutic nature 
of alternative dispute resolution techniques in some circumstances, such as actions involving 
victims of domestic violence and their abusers. Cf Grillo, supra note 62, at 1584-85 
(discussing the role of mediation in situations involving victims of domestic violence). 
180. Melton, supra note 7, at 2003. The conclusion that judges in family legal proceedings 
already affect participants' behavior seems inescapable: 
Because judges presumably are affecting therapeutic and rehabilitative 
consequences anyway, a therapeutic jurisprudence approach would suggest that, 
while they remain fully cognizant of their obligation to dispense justice according 
to principles of due process of law, judges should indeed try to become less lousy 
in their inescapable role as social worker. 
Wexler, supra note 151, at 299. 
181. RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 45, at 3. 
182. Melton, supra note 7, at 2004, 2044 n.272 (discussing the need for citizen advisory 
groups to provide input to the courts). 
183. !d. at 2004; see also Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private 
Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT TIlE CROSSROADS 166 (Stephen 
D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). Some fear, however, that courts may become too 
much like human services agencies if they attempt to perform these functions: 
Retooling the judicial process to cope with the new responsibilities of the courts 
means enhancing their capacity to function more systematically in terms of 
general categories that transcend individual cases. Some such innovations are 
required. And yet, it would seem, there is a limit to the changes of this kind that 
courts can absorb and still remain courts. . . . The danger is that courts, in 
developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become 
altogether too much like them. 
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In an effort to establish and nurture linkages between and among the 
microsystems, mesosystems, and exosystems within which family members 
participate, family law advocates, decisionmakers, and services providers must 
coordinate their efforts to assist individuals and families. This need for 
collaboration may result in shifting to social servicesl84 agencies external or 
adjunct to the court system some of the court's functions. 18s In the process of 
attempts at timely agency intervention to resolve families' problems, however, 
"[p]eople should not have to go to court to get help.,,186 Society as a whole must 
begin to "acknowledge that this type of intervention and support is therapeutic for 
families, rather than viewing the intervention as an indication that families have 
failed. 187 The fact that service agencies in our society generally are very highly 
specialized, with little integration among the various service agencies and with 
an emphasis on treatment of problems rather than on problem prevention,188 
complicates this facet of an ecological and therapeutic approach to family law 
HOROWITZ, supra note 171, at 298. 
184. See MORONEY, supra note 12, at 13 (defining social services "as those services 
designed to aid individuals and groups to meet their basic needs, to enhance social functioning, 
to develop their potential, and to promote general well-being") (footnote omitted). 
185. Melton, supra note 7, at 200t; see also Resnik. supra note 179, at 438-40 (discussing 
the issues of alternative dispute centers and agency adjudication). Many barriers exist to 
attempts by courts and agencies to coordinate efforts to serve families: 
Agencies and organizations often jealously guard their organizational turf and 
may be reluctant to relinquish some of the control they have over clients in 
traditional one-to-one relationships. Practitioners may be unwilling to share their 
functions with non-professionals. They may see central figures in personal social 
networks as incapable of dispensing help to needy families. New approaches that 
work to strengthen personal social networks may appear to be luxuries that most 
agencies cannot afford. What is more, efforts to promote and strengthen personal 
social networks raise the issues of confidentiality, autonomy, and privacy. 
Garbarino & Stocking, supra note 174, at 11. 
186. Melton, supra note 7, at 2047. 
187. Americans tend to believe that reliance on social services or reliance on others for 
assistance constitutes an admission offailure: 
It is apparent that all families make use of (and many more are in need of) 
some form of outside help in raising their children, yet we still maintain a myth 
of self-sufficiency. Since in reality we are dependent on each other, it makes little 
sense to perpetuate the myth that we are not Valuing independence stigmatizes 
those individuals who use family services as well as those individuals who 
provide them. A new concept of the way in which families (and individuals) 
should interact with each other and the other elements of society is imperative. 
Why not acknowledge the interdependence that already exists? Why not see it as 
positive? 
James Garbarino et aI., Who Owns the Children? An &ological Perspective on Public Policy 
Affecting Children, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECflNG CHILD & Yourn SERVICES 43, 46-47 (Gary 
B. Melton ed., 1982) (footnote omitted). 
188. Anne Marie Tietjen, Integrating Formal and Informal Support Systems: The Swedish 
Experience, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DEVELOPING AND 
MAiNTAINING EFFEcrIVE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAMILIES 15, 17 (James Garbarino & S. Holly 
Stocking eds., 1980). 
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decisionmaking.189 On the other hand, the need for collaboration with other 
agencies does not mean that courts must relinquish their role as "the 'last resort' 
arbiter"I90 of fundamental legal questions. To the contrary, courts must insist on 
maintaining this function, as this belongs uniquely to the adjudicative process.191 
An ecological and therapeutic approach to family law jurisprudence, however, 
does modify longstanding notions of adjudication. 
Advocates and parties to disputes generally perceive adjudication as focused. 
They ask the judge to determine whether one party has a right or duty, rather than 
189. See Edward F. Hennessey, The Family, the Courts, "and Mental Health Professionals, 
44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1223, 1224 (1989) (advocating the need for therapeutic services due 
to the traumatic nature of many divorce and custody matters, as well as the importance of the 
fundamental familial rights courts must address in these cases); see also Peter Salem et al., 
Parent Education as a Distinct Field of Practice: The Agenda for the Future, 34 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 9 (1996) (examining issues of professional responsibility, 
accountability, standards, and procedures for the proliferation of parent education programs 
developed to help families deal with the difficult impact of separatiQn and divorce, as well as 
the need for these programs to be court connected). "Most parent education programs are court 
connected in the sense that much of their support and referrals come from judges who hear 
cases arising out of separation and divorce. The legal system needs assistance in enabling 
parents to help their children." Id. at 18. 
For examples of existing educational programs designed specifically to assist participants 
in family legal proceedings, see Larry Lehner, Educationfor Parents Divorcing in California, 
32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 50 (1994) (describing a variety of court-connected 
educational programs for family law litigants in California); Virginia Petersen & Susan B. 
Steinman, Helping Children Succeed After Divorce: A Court-Mandated Education Program 
for Divorcing Parents, 32 F AM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REv. 27 (1994) (discussing a mandatory 
parent education program in Ohio for divorcing couples with children, the goals of which 
include providing parents information about how to help their children with the divorce 
process, about divorce-specific resources and services, about options for problem solving, and 
about how to remain independent of the court); Carol Roeder-Esser, Families in Transition: 
A Divorce Workshop, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REv. 40 (1994) (describing a court-
connected mandatory divorce orientation program in Kansas that focuses on the psychological, 
social, legal, and child-related effects of divorce, as well as enumerating optional educational 
programs on other topics, including step parenting, grandparents' visitation, and single 
parenting); Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary Report and a Model Statute 
on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and Separating Parents, 27 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1993) (describing a court connected interdisciplinary parent education 
program in New York for parents involved in custody, child support, and divorce and 
separation, and detailing the cooperation among the courts, mental health professionals, and 
educators); Bill Miller, Divorce's Hard Lessons: Court-Ordered Classes Focus on the 
Children, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1994, at AI, A12 (describing parent education programs in 
Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.). 
For a discussion of court-based mediation programs, see Milne, supra note 65, at 68-69. See 
also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, MEDIATION INVOLVING JUVENILES: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND 
POLICY QUESTIONS 45 (1991) (discussing the use of mediation in disputes wherein one of the 
parties is ajuvenile). 
190. Melton, supra note 7, at 2045. 
191. See HOROWITZ, supra note 171, at 298 ("The danger is that courts, in developing a 
capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become altogether too much like 
them."). 
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request the judge to devise alternatives for the parties. 192 Adjudication of family 
legal proceedings in an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential model, 
however, compels a judge to consider alternatives. The judge must attempt to 
establish as many linkages as possible between and among various systems 
within which family members participate. 
In contrast to the resolution of disputes in a piecemeal process, where the 
judge's power to decide extends only to the issues presented,193 application of the 
interdisciplinary family law jurisprudential model encourages judges to consider 
all of a family's legal proceedings and related issues. This type of problem 
identification enables judges to develop a holistic assessment of the family's 
legal and social needs and to devise more comprehensive legal remedies. 
Traditionally, judges conduct fact-finding at some distance from the social 
settings of the cases they decide. 194 This isolation can render judges' fact-finding 
misguided and uninformed. Pursuant to an ecological and therapeutic 
jurisprudential paradigm, judges' involvement with the community and its 
organizations enables the judges to understand the contextual basis for their fact-
finding. This contextualized fact-finding allows judges to more realistically and 
effectively address litigants' needs. 
Finally, traditional notions of adjudication make no provisions for policy 
review, as judges base their decisions on precedent and behavior that predates the 
litigation.19s Acknowledging that judges' decisions in family legal proceedings 
constitute family intervention, the remedies judges fashion in an interdisciplinary 
jurisprudential paradigm need to reflect policies that support families. 
Application of both the ecology of human development perspective and notions 
of therapeutic justice to the resolution of family legal proceedings provides a . 
jurisprudential paradigm for family law decisionmaking that empowers the court. 
This jurisprudential framework offers a means for courts to approach family 
problems in a systematic manner and to more effectively resolve the many and 
complex family legal matters they face. 
The distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure of social 
resources on individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits the courts 
for much of the important work .... Retooling the judicial process to cope 
with the new responsibilities ofthe courts means enhancing their capacity to 
function more systematically in terms of general categories that transcend 
individual cases. Some ... innovations are required. 196 
An interdisciplinary jurisprudential approach can refit the courts now, as well as 
adequately prepare the courts to effectively address the novel and complex family 
legal challenges of the future. 
192.1d. at 34. 
193. 1d. at 35. 
194. 1d. at 45. 
195.1d. at 51. 
196.1d. at 298. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed an interdisciplinary jurisprudential paradigm that 
provides a common analytic framework for the resolution of all family legal 
proceedings. The paradigm assists family law decisionmakers to account for the 
diversity among individuals, legal issues, social issues, and other related matters 
that constitute the cases before them and that create the plurality and richness of 
American society. The paradigm can operate within any decisionmaking structure 
or system for resolving family legal matters. As such, the ecological and 
therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm can enjoy broad and universal application. 
Because parties seeking resolution of family legal matters entrust judges to 
make critical decisions affecting individuals' and families' daily lives, judges in 
these cases must be more than triers of fact. Family law decisionmakers must 
embrace as a goal of family law jurisprudence the need to strengthen individuals 
and families and to enhance their functioning. This objective challenges 
decisionmakers to examine the family holistically, identifying how family 
members interact with other aspects of the family ecology at the present time and 
over the course of time. Judges must know and understand the backgrounds and 
communities from which family law litigants and their legal issues emerge. 
A novel and expanded role for social science in the law can assist with this 
task. Applying the ecology of human development paradigm to structure family 
law decisionmaking allows judges to identify the systems within which 
individuals and families function, as well as the organizations and human 
services agencies that can assist families in a therapeutic manner. In fashioning 
their legal remedies, judges must establish linkages between individuals and the 
various systems within which they operate. These remedies can strengthen 
families' functioning by providing families with necessary support. 
This Article has attempted to respond to calls for a change in legal perspective 
in family law decisionmaking,J97 as well as challenges to "enhance cooperation 
between lawyers and social scientists concerned with family law and public 
policy."198 Social science has contributed to the law in diverse ways since the 
beginning of this century. As society prepares to move into the next century, 
application of this interdisciplinary paradigm to resolve family legal proceedings 
represents an appropriate evolution in the collaboration between law and the 
social sciences. While the American family may face an uncertain future, 199 
history assures us that some form of the family is certain to endure. An 
interdisciplinary paradigm for family law jurisprudence that applies the ecology 
of human development perspective and notions of therapeutic justice can ensure 
that family law decisionmakers and the courts are a source of strength and 
support for the continued and enhanced functioning of American families. 
197. Younger, supra note 148, at 501. 
198. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 685. 
199. Younger, supra note 148, at 501 (footnote omitted). 
